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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN RASMUSSEN, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
) No. 20512 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ) 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, ) and 
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE ) 
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, a ) No. 20755 
New York corporation, and ) 
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a ) 
Maryland joint venture, dba ) 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, ) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondent Deseret Federal is involved in only one 
basic issue on appeal. The issue presented to this Court for 
review, as to Deseret Federal, is whether the District Court 
properly found that the statute of frauds precludes the 
enforcement of an alleged oral agreement between Rasmussen and 
Deseret Federal. That issue involves consideration of the 
following: 
1. Is the doctrine of promissory estoppel available 
under these facts to defeat the statute of frauds? 
2. Are there sufficient memoranda of the alleged oral 
agreement with Deseret Federal to remove the agreement from the 
statute of frauds? 
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3. Are there any acts of part performance to justify 
the enforcement of the alleged oral agreement between Rasmussen 
and Deseret Federal? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
As the district court recognized, the Utah statute of 
frauds is dispositive of Rasmussen1s claims against Deseret 
Federal. The applicable provisions state: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one 
yearf nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assignedr surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of lawf or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1984). 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be 
void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
16. § 25-5-3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by appellant Rasmussen against 
Deseret Federal and Crossroads alleging breach of an oral 
agreement to lease a portion of the space occupied by Deseret 
Federal at the Crossroads Plaza Mall in Salt Lake City. District 
Judge Sawaya ruled that the alleged oral agreement was void under 
the statute of frauds. Appeal No. 20512 seeks a reversal of a 
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summary judgment entered in favor of Deseret Federal on December 
10, 1984. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Deseret Federal disagrees with Rasmussen's Statement of 
Facts in many respects. Further, many of the facts asserted 
pertain only to a dispute between Rasmussen and Crossroads. 
Consequently, Deseret Federal submits the following statement of 
facts that were not controverted by Rasmussen. Because this 
appeal requires the Court to review a summary judgment, the facts 
are stated in a light most favorable to Rasmussen. 
In 1981, Rasmussen approached Deseret Federal with the 
desire to lease or sublet a portion of the space Deseret Federal 
was then leasing from Crossroads on the main mall level of the 
Crossroads Plaza shopping center in Salt Lake City, Utah. R. 
175 (Rasmussen Depo. 59). Discussions ensued and continued for a 
substantial period of time. Deseret Federal, principally through 
Howard Swapp, a Vice President of Deseret Federal, discussed with 
Rasmussen the possibility of an arrangement whereby Deseret 
Federal would be released by Crossroads of the subject space and 
all attendant responsibilities, allowing Rasmussen to lease the 
space directly from Crossroads. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 60). 
Rasmussen contemplated a lease of approximately 10 
years but there were also discussions of a 12 year lease. R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. 69-70). Additionally, Deseret Federal and 
Rasmussen discussed that the space involved would include 
-3-
releasing 790 square feet or possibly 950 square feet. R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. 22-23). 
In a letter dated July 6, 1982, Rasmussen reiterated 
his desire to lease a portion of the space then occupied by 
Deseret Federal. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 58; Exhibit 28). At 
all pertinent times, Rasmussen understood that a written release 
of Deseret Federal's leasehold interest in the subject space was 
a condition to any agreement between Deseret Federal and 
Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 22-23). Further, Rasmussen 
fully understood that a written lease between Crossroads and 
Rasmussen was a condition to any agreement between Deseret 
Federal and Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 25-26). 
On January 13, 1983f Howard Swappf on behalf of Deseret 
Federal, wrote a letter to Kravco, Inc. ("Kravco") , Crossroads' 
leasing agent, authorizing Kravco to act as Deseret Federal's 
agent in the negotiations to release Deseret Federal from its 
obligations with respect to the subject space and to re-let such 
space to Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo., Exhibit 2). A copy 
of that letter is attached hereto as Addendum 1 for the 
convenience of the court. The January 13 letter states, "for 
several months Deseret Federal Savings and Vaughn Rasmussen have 
been negotiating a proposal that Deseret Federal would vacate and 
Vaughn Rasmussen would occupy approximately 950 square feet of 
our space on the main plaza level." R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo., 
Exhibit 2) (emphasis added). The letter further states that the 
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following conditions would apply to any arrangement among Deseret 
Federal, Crossroads, and Rasmussen: 
(1) The subject space was available only to Rasmussen; 
(2) Deseret Federal would be unconditionally released 
from all tenant responsibility for the space; 
(3) Deseret Federal was not to pay any fees, charges, 
etc., relative to the transaction; and 
(4) Deseret Federal and Rasmussen were to fully 
execute additional agreements. 
Id. Further, the January 13 authorization letter also stated 
that Kravco's authority to act as agent in the negotiations with 
Rasmussen would expire on March 15, 1983. R. 175 (Rasmussen 
Depo. 3, Exhibit 2). At his deposition in this case, Rasmussen 
acknowledged that the terms of the January 13 letter from Deseret 
Federal to Kravco were fully consistent with the terms discussed 
in negotiations between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen. R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. 76). 
On March 9, 1983, Bruce Barcal sent a letter to Deseret 
Federal stating that it was Crossroads1 "intent" to release 
Deseret Federal from its obligations with respect to the subject 
space. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo., Exhibit 4). A copy of that 
letter is attached hereto as Addendum 2. The letter further 
states that formal documents would be sent for execution by the 
parties. Such documents, however, were not provided to Deseret 
Federal prior to the March 15, 1983 deadline. R. 129 (Swapp 
Affidavit). On April 13, 1983, long after the deadline, 
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Crossroads delivered a proposed lease agreement to Rasmussen. R. 
159. However, no agreements were executed concerning the subject 
space between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen before the March 15 
deadline or at any time thereafter. R. 129 (Swapp Affidavit). 
Following the March 15f 1983 deadline when Kravco's 
authority to act as Deseret Federal's agent expiredf Rasmussen 
and Deseret Federal discussed details of a possible sublease 
whereby Deseret Federal would directly sublease the subject space 
to Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 69-70). Deseret Federal 
indicated to Rasmussen they would consider subletting the subject 
space instead of completely releasing the space. R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. 51, Exhibit 12). The proposed sublease 
contemplated a period of 12 years with rent "somewhere in the 
neighborhood" of $25.00 a foot. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 66-67). 
Any agreement to sublease was conditioned upon, among other 
things, the consent of Crossroads. Indeed, Rasmussen understood 
that no sublease arrangement was possible unless Deseret Federal 
and Rasmussen obtained Crossroads1 consent to such an 
arrangement. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 68-69). Rasmussen 
requested the consent of Crossroads for the sublease but such 
consent was denied. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 3, 58, Exhibits 6, 
22). No written agreement for a sublease of the subject space 
was ever executed between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen. R. 129 
(Swapp Affidavit). 
Rasmussen asserts that he spent a great deal of money 
to obtain a loan from the small business administration in 
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connection with the subject spacef to prepare construction plans 
for the subject space and for space that Deseret Federal was to 
occupy in lieu of the subject space, and to purchase inventory 
for the new store. However, Rasmussen never took possession of 
the subject space, paid any rents to Deseret Federal or 
Crossroads for the subject space, made any repairs or 
improvements to the premises, or purchased and installed any 
fixtures. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court properly concluded that, as a matter 
of law, any alleged oral agreement between Rasmussen and Deseret 
Federal is void under the statute of frauds. Rasmussen argues 
that there are factual issues concerning the operation of the 
statute of frauds. Specifically, Rasmussen contends that factual 
issues exist with respect to (1) whether the statute of frauds 
should not be applied under the doctrine of
 r;D >issory estoppel, 
(2) whether there are sufficient memoranda of the alleged oral 
agreement, or (3) whether Rasmussen's conduct constitutes part 
performance. Each of those arguments must be rejected. 
Promissory estoppel was not raised in the district 
court and may not be raised for the first time in this appeal. 
Moreover, under Utah law the acts and conduct of the promissor 
must clearly manifest an intention not to assert the statute of 
frauds that to permit him to do so would work a fraud on the 
other party. The undisputed facts do not even hint at such an 
intention. Further, this Court has recognized that written 
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memoranda must expressly or impliedly acknowledge or recognize 
that a contract has been entered into to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. To the contrary, the writings relied upon by Rasmussen 
refer to the alleged agreement as a "proposal" in the process of 
negotiation. 
Finally, the acts of past performance relied upon by 
Rasmussen are simply insufficient to establish the alleged 
agreement. Rasmussen did not take possession of the subject 
space, make any valuable improvements, or pay any consideration 
to Deseret Federal. The district court properly entered summary 
judgment in favor of Deseret Federal and that ruling should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant Rasmussen seeks to enforce an alleged oral 
agreement between Rasmussen and Deseret Federal that Deseret 
Federal would surrender its leasehold interest in a portion of 
its space and would consent to a lease of that space by 
Crossroads to Rasmussen. This alleged oral contract is squarely 
within the first section of the Utah Statute of Frauds which 
provides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1984) (emphasis added). The alleged 
agreement also comes within the language of Section 3 of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds. See Id. § 25-5-3. 
Rasmussen concedes that the alleged oral agreement 
comes within the statute of frauds but asserts that the statute 
should not be enforced in this case. As the district court 
properly concluded, however, the exceptions to the statute urged 
by Rasmussen are unavailable as a matter of law. 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Rasmussen first contends that there are factual issues 
concerning the doctrine of promissory estoppel. A review of the 
record in this matter does not reveal that this theory was before 
the trial court at any time prior to entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Deseret Federal. This Court should therefore refuse to 
consider this issue. See, e.g. , Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 
553, 557 (Utah 1984) ("Where an issue is not raised in the trial 
court, this court will not consider it on appeal."); Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983). 
In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
unavailable under the facts in this case. Promissory estoppel 
historically has been used as a substitute for consideration but 
has been extended by most courts, including this Court, to act as 
a bar to a statute of frauds defense. See Ravarino v. Price, 123 
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Utah 559f 260 P.2d 570 (1953). This Court, however, has 
recognized a very limited application of the doctrine. 
In
 McKinnon v. Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1974), this Court reaffirmed a limited application of the 
promissory estoppel doctrine recognized in an earlier case: 
[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel [was] 
extended, in a limited form, to those cases 
concerned with . . . the Statute of Frauds 
where the promise as to future conduct 
constituted the intended abandonment of an 
existing right of the promissor. However, a 
mere promise to execute a written contract 
and a subsequent refusal to do so is 
insufficient to create an estoppel, although 
reliance is placed on such a promise and 
damage is sustained as a consequence of the 
refusal. The acts and conduct of the 
promissor must so clearly manifest an 
intention that he will not assert the statute 
that to permit him to do so would be to work 
a fraud on the other party. 
Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added). The limitations recognized in 
McKinnon are essential to prevent the statute of frauds from 
becoming meaningless. See Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 
P.2d 332 (1956). Consequently, under Utah law the party 
attempting to assert promissory estoppel to enforce an oral 
promise must prove: (1) a promise, (2) which the promissor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance on the 
part of the promissee, (3) which does induce the action or 
forebearance, (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise, (5) the promise as to future conduct constituted the 
intended abandonment of an existing right of the promissor, and 
-10-
(6) the acts and conduct of the promissor must so clearly 
manifest an intention that he will not assert the statute that to 
permit him to do so would be to work a fraud on the other party. 
Id.; Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 575; see also Restatement (Second) Of 
Contracts § 139 (1981); 3 S. Williston & w. Jaeger, The Law of 
Contracts § 533A (1960). In this casef the undisputed facts 
demonstrate that these requirements have not been satisfied. 
A. The Undisputed Facts Demonstrate that Deseret 
Federal Made No Unconditional Promise. 
There is no evidence that Deseret Federal 
unconditionally promised to surrender its leasehold interest in 
the subject space to Rasmussen. Indeedf the undisputed evidence 
in the record indicates that several conditions existed to any 
promise by Deseret Federal to Rasmussen, that Rasmussen fully 
understood such conditions, and that the conditions were not 
satisfied. 
In the letter of January 13, 1983, relied upon by 
Rasmussen, Deseret Federal refers to the alleged oral agreement 
as a l!proposal" that the parties had been "negotiating." The 
letter then sets forth the specific conditions required by 
Deseret Federal to be met prior to releasing its leasehold 
interest in the subject space. Those conditions were: (1) that 
Deseret Federal be unconditionally released from any 
responsibility for the subject space by Crossroads, (2) that 
Deseret Federal not be required to pay any fees, charges, or 
commissions in connection with the transaction, and (3) that 
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Deseret Federal and Rasmussen fully execute the relevant 
agreements. Rasmussen testified that he understood that a 
written lease between Crossroads and Rasmussen was a condition to 
any agreement between Deseret Federal and Rasmussen for release 
of the subject space. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 25-26, 74-75). 
Similarly, Rasmussen understood that no sublease arrangement was 
possible between himself and Deseret Federal unless he obtained 
Crossroads1 consent to the sublease. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 
68-69) . 
A binding contract cannot exist when the agreement 
depends on the satisfaction of conditions precedent which 
admittedly have not been satisfied. See
 f e.g.f Clayton v. 
Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982). For 
example, in Welch Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 
73 (Utah 1983), the parties agreed to exchange certain real 
property conditioned upon obtaining a release from third parties 
with interests in the land. A release was not obtained and the 
Court held the contract invalid. In so holding, the Court 
stated: "Where fulfillment of a contract is made to depend upon 
the act or consent of a third person over whom neither party has 
any control, the contract cannot be enforced unless the act is 
performed or the consent given." JEd. at 76. 
The facts here are indistinguishable from those in 
Welch Transfer. Rasmussen has admitted that any agreement with 
Deseret Federal was conditioned upon an unconditional and 
complete release of Deseret Federal by Crossroads, a written 
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lease between Crossroads and Rasmussen, and the execution of 
final agreements. Because these conditions have not been 
satisfied, there simply is no enforceable promise, which is an 
essential requirement of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
B. Deseret Federal Always Maintained its Right to Rely 
Upon the Protection of the Statute of Frauds. 
No promise of Deseret Federal as to future 
conduct constituted the intended abandonment of an existing 
right. Deseret Federal had the right to require a final written 
agreement between itself and Rasmussen and to require a written 
release from Crossroads prior to consummation of the transaction. 
There is no evidence in the record that Deseret Federal ever 
abandoned its right to assert the statute of frauds or held such 
an intention. Indeed, Deseret Federal retained and exercised its 
full and complete right to assert the statute of frauds. The 
conditions stated in the January 13 letter plainly indicate that 
Deseret Federal required a written release from Crossroads and 
that Deseret Federal and Rasmussen fully execute final agreements 
before consummation of the transaction. 
The acts and conduct of Deseret Federal do not manifest 
an intention that it would not assert the statute. Rasmussen 
contends that Bruce Barcal (presumably acting as agent for 
Crossroads and Deseret Federal) encouraged Rasmussen to take 
action in reliance on the existence of a lease. Rasmussen claims 
that Barcal assured Rasmussen that it was alright to proceed with 
financing, remodeling plans, and purchase of inventory because 
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documents were being prepared. Further, Rasmussen contends that 
Barcal specified a weekend when final lease documents were to 
have been delivered. Such conduct, howeverf is insufficient as a 
matter of law under the standard set forth by this Court to 
justify avoidance of the statute of frauds. 
As set forth in Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386f 295 
P.2d 332, 334 (1956) : 
In most instances of negotiations for 
transactions included within the statute a 
reduction of the contract to writing is 
contemplated, and, in all probability, the 
parties will discuss who will draw the 
instrument and when and where it will be 
signed. The mere refusal to execute a 
written contract as agreed does not 
constitute "Fraud" within the rule that the 
Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where 
the effect would be to perpetrate a fraud, 
. . . and to hold otherwise would, in effect, 
completely nullify the Statute of Frauds. 
This case comes within the analysis of this Court in 
Easton. The parties contemplated a reduction of their proposed 
agreement to writing and discussed who would draft the agreement. 
As was its right, however, Deseret Federal refused to proceed 
with the transaction when the documents did not arrive within the 
period set forth in the January 13, 1983 letter to Bruce Barcal. 
Such a refusal cannot be construed to constitute the perpetration 
of a fraud. To the contrary, the acts and conduct of Deseret 
Federal in setting a condition that final written documents be 
required before finalization of the proposed agreement and in 
ultimately requiring Crossroads to prepare final agreements for 
the signature of all parties suggests an intent to assert the 
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full protection of the statute of frauds. The testimony of 
Rasmussen indicates a complete awareness that none of the parties 
would be bound to the proposed agreement in the absence of final 
written documents. 
The cases cited by Rasmussen in support of his argument 
that promissory estoppel should be applied in this case do not 
apply the standard required by Utah law and in fact support the 
position of Deseret Federal. Indeed, Rasmussen1s brief 
conspicuously lacks any Utah cases that are supportive of his 
argument. 
Rasmussen first relies upon Mauala v. Millford 
Management Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The 
standard applied in that case is similar to the Utah standard in 
that the court required a "fraudulent oral promise." Howeverf 
t^e Mauala court found that sufficient evidence of fraud existed 
in that case for the matter to go to a jury. In Maula, the 
parties had an oral agreement for the lease of an apartment and 
in fact a written agreement was signed by the plaintiff and sent 
to the defendant but never returned. The plaintiff entered into 
possession, painted the apartment in accordance with the color 
specifications set by the defendant, and was merely waiting to 
move into the apartment. In fact, the defendant had received a 
substantial benefit and gave no indication that it intended to 
rely upon the statute of frauds. By contrast, there is no 
evidence of fraud in the instant case. Deseret Federal has 
always taken the position that there would be no agreement until 
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the final written documents were signed. Rasmussen was fully 
aware of that condition. Moreover, there is no evidence here 
that Deseret Federal received any benefit from Rasmussen1s 
alleged actions taken in reliance on the oral agreement which 
would support an inference of fraud as in Mauala. 
The second case relied upon by Rasmussen, Lacy v. 
Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781 (1940), is also 
inapplicable. The Lacy court applied a standard much different 
from the standard established by the Utah cases. In addition, 
the only issue before the court was whether the party against 
whom the promise is sought to be enforced must receive some 
benefit or consideration. 
The facts in this case indicate that Deseret Federal 
never made an unconditional promise to release the subject space 
to Rasmussen. Any agreement was conditioned upon Crossroads' 
approval and the execution of final lease documents. Deseret 
Federal never manifested any intention that it would not assert 
the statute of frauds and to permit it to do so does not work a 
fraud upon Rasmussen. Promissory estoppel is therefore 
unavailable as a matter of law. 
II. THERE ARE NO MEMORANDA OF ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN RASMUSSEN 
AND DESERET FEDERAL WHICH PRECLUDE APPLICATION OF THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Rasmussen next attempts to avoid application of the 
statute of frauds by arguing that there are sufficient memoranda 
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of Deseret Federal's promise to surrender its space and 
Crossroads' promise to lease the space to take the alleged oral 
agreement out of the statute of frauds. The trial court properly 
rejected this argument, concluding as a matter of law that the 
documents relied upon by Rasmussen do not constitute a sufficient 
memorandum of any agreement between the parties. 
Under Utah law, written memoranda of an oral agreement, 
which are subscribed by the party to be charged, are sufficient 
to remove such an agreement from the application of the statute 
of frauds if: (1) the memorandum acknowledges or recognizes that 
a contract has been entered into by the parties, and (2) the 
memorandum contains all the essential terms and provisions of the 
contract. The documents relied upon by Rasmussen fail to satisfy 
these requirements. 
A
* The Documents Fail to Acknowledge or Recognize that 
a Contract Had Been Entered Into by the Parties. 
This Court has long recognized the general rule 
that to constitute a sufficient memorandum, a writing or a group 
of writings taken together must contain "an acknowledgement or 
recognition that a contract has been entered into by the 
parties." Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 
P.2d 578, 580 (1952). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
adopts the same standard. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 131(b) & comment f (1979). In the Birdzell case, the plaintiff 
attempted to enforce an oral contract for a lease based on a 
letter written by the defendant. The letter, however, indicated 
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that the parties were "negotiating" for a lease and stated the 
terms upon which a lease would be available. The Court concluded 
that the letter did not suffice as an adequate memorandum because 
it lacked an acknowledgement or recognition that the parties had 
reached an agreement. 
The facts in this case are strikingly similar to those 
in Birdzell. None of the writings relied upon by Rasmussen 
contain an acknowledgement or recognition of any oral agreement. 
Instead, the writings state that the parties had been negotiating 
a proposal and that any agreement was subject to certain 
specified conditions, including the receipt and execution of 
final documentation. 
Rasmussen specifies four writings which allegedly 
constitute a memorandum of an agreement between the parties: (1) 
a letter from Howard J. Swapp to Bruce Barcal dated January 13, 
1983f (2) an unsigned agreement concerning remodeling of certain 
space to be used by Deseret Federal, (3) a letter from Bruce 
Barcal to Bruce Cundick dated March 9, 1983, and (4) the unsigned 
lease agreement delivered to Rasmussen by Crossroads. See 
Appellant's Brief 18-22. The January 13 letter from Howard Swapp 
to Bruce Barcal states that Deseret Federal had been "negotiating 
a proposal" concerning the subject space. See Addendum "1". 
Additionally, as previously discussed, the letter sets forth four 
conditions that needed to be met prior to consummation of any 
such proposal. Finally, the letter grants authority to Bruce 
Barcal to act on behalf of Deseret Federal to finalize the 
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proposal but provides that such authority would expire on March 
15, 1983. Nowhere in that letter is it even implied that a 
binding agreement had been reached concerning the subject space. 
The March 9 letter from Bruce Barcal to Bruce Cundick 
states "please accept this letter, as an expression of intent for 
Crossroads Plaza to release Deseret Federal Savings from 
approximately 790.5 square feet of their space at Crossroads 
Plaza." See Addendum "2". The letter also states that Kravco, 
Inc., Crossroads1 leasing agent, was preparing leases and lease 
surrender forms. Thus the letter expresses an intent to 
consummate the negotiations of the parties but in no way states 
or implies that any agreement had already been reached. 
The two unsigned agreements relied upon by Rasmussen 
cannot be construed to acknowledge or imply that the parties had 
reached an agreement and entered into a contract. Indeed, the 
agreements are unsigned and the parties intended the same to 
remain unsigned until an agreement was finally reached. 
Rasmussen relies on three Utah cases in support of his 
argument that sufficient memoranda of the agreement existed in 
this case. In each of those cases, however, the writings relied 
upon contained an express acknowledgement that the parties had 
reached an agreement. In Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 
1980), the court concluded that a check and an unsigned deed 
constituted sufficient memoranda of an oral agreement to convey a 
parcel of land. The check relied upon stated "one-half payment 
on land as agreed - other one-half payment when deed delivered." 
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With that language, there was no doubt that the parties were not 
merely negotiating for the purchase and sale of the land but had 
in fact reached an agreement. 
Similarly, in Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah 
1979), receipts of payment actually received by the seller of 
property were held to be sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. The receipts specifically referred to the transaction as 
a "sale" and acknowledged receipt of part payment for the 
property in question. The only issue in the case was the 
adequacy of the property description. 
In Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 Utah (1974), 
also relied upon by Rasmussen, the oral contract between the 
parties was specifically acknowledged in certain letters. The 
parties were partners in a mining venture and a letter from the 
defendant to the plaintiff expressly acknowledged the agreement 
and stated only a condition that if ore were discovered, that a 
one-half interest in the claims would be conveyed to the 
plaintiff. 
As stated by Professor Corbin, 
Letters and other memoranda are not 
sufficient to satisfy the statute, even 
though they contain explicit references to 
each other, unless they amount to an 
acknowledgement by the party to be charged 
that he has assented to the contract that is 
asserted by the other party. If, when 
interpreted together, they show no more than 
preliminary negotiations suggesting terms to 
be later agreed upon, they are insufficient 
to establish a contract. This would be 
equally true, even if no statute of frauds 
existed. 
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2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 517 (1950) (emphasis added). 
This rule recognizes that there must be a contract between the 
parties before such a contract can be enforced. The rule makes 
it possible for parties to negotiate without the fear of 
liability for agreements not yet made. That purpose for the 
statute of frauds is well-established and has been expressed by 
various courts. For examplef in Yacobian v. J. D. Carson Co., 
205 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo. App. 1947), the court stated, "parties 
having in contemplation a lease contract are and should be 
privileged to negotiate and truly discuss the terms and 
conditions that each will agree to and neither be bound by their 
tentative agreements until they are placed in writing and 
signed." Id. at 925 (emphasis added). 
The undisputed facts show that Rasmussen was well aware 
that any agreement with Deseret Federal was predicated upon a 
written release of Deseret Federal and a new written lease by 
Crossroads to Rasmussen. No such documents were ever executed. 
Rasmussen's reliance on preliminary negotiations that were 
contingent on execution of final written agreements are 
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of a written memorandum. 
B. The Memoranda Relied Upon Do Not Identify the 
Essential Terms of the Alleged Oral Agreement. 
This court has consistently recognized that "It 
is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied upon to 
satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the essential 
terms and provisions of the contract." Birdzell v. Utah Oil 
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Refining Co,, 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952); see, e.g., 
McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp, 631 P.2d 851, 854 
(Utah 1981). At a minimum, a contract for a lease in excess of 
one year must specify the amount of property to be leased, a 
definite and agreed term, and a fixed rental rate. See, e.g., 
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1377 (Utah 
1976) (invalidating a contract to renew a lease because the 
parties had not agreed on a rental rate); Birdzell, 242 P.2d at 
580. 
In the present case, Rasmussen admits that the parties 
discussed a lease of both 790 square feet and 950 square feet. 
The term of years for the purported release/re-let agreement was 
equally ambiguous — possibly 10 years, possibly 12. And 
according to Rasmussen1s own testimony, rent for a sublease was 
discussed as "somewhere in the neighborhood" of $25.00 a foot, 
certainly not words of agreement. The letters relied upon by 
Rasmussen as constituting memoranda of the agreement contain no 
reference to any terms. Moreover, the other unexecuted 
agreements relied upon by Rasmussen contain terms at variance 
with the terms testified to by Rasmussen in his deposition. 
Because the documents do not contain an adequate description of 
the terms of the alleged oral agreement, the trial court properly 
ruled that the statute of frauds is applicable in this case. 
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III. THE ACTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF IN ANTICIPATION OF AN 
AGREEMENT FOR A LEASE DO NOT CONSTITUTE PART PERFORMANCE. 
Rasmussen further attempts to avoid the application of 
the statute of frauds by alleging that the acts taken by him in 
anticipation of an agreement to lease the subject space 
constitute part performance. Rasmussen argues that factual 
issues remain concerning whether specific performance is 
available in this case based on the alleged part performance. As 
will be demonstrated, however, the acts taken by Rasmussen cannot 
legally constitute sufficient part performance to avoid the 
statute. 
In McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp., 631 
P.2d 851 (Utah 1981)f this Court recognized that the doctrine of 
part performance is generally available only in two specific 
circumstances: (1) "where valuable improvements have been made 
to property by a plaintiff who has taken possession," or (2) 
"where the contract terms have been fully performed by the party 
seeking enforcement of a clear and definite oral contract." Id. 
at 853. In these two instances, "failure to enforce the oral 
contract would work a fraud on the person who performed pursuant 
to the terms of the agreement." JTd. In this case, Rasmussen's 
acts were not part performance at all, but were merely 
preparatory acts taken with the hope that the transaction would 
be consummated. 
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A. Rasmussen Did Not Enter Into Possession of the 
Subject Space or Make Valuable Improvements. 
The first category of cases in which this Court 
has recognized the applicability of the doctrine of part 
performance involves cases where valuable improvements have been 
made and the plaintiff has taken possession of the property. 
See , e.g. , Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah 1980). In such cases, 
the oral contract must be clear and definite and established by 
clear and definite testimony: 
In addition, part performance requires that 
(1) any improvements made on the property 
must be substantial and valuable; (2) 
valuable consideration must be given; (3) 
possession must be actual and open; and (4) 
the acts of part performance must be 
exclusively referable to the contract. 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982); see Coleman v. 
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981). These requirements 
reflect the general rule that, "Acts . . . which are merely 
preliminary, preparatory, or ancillary to the contract to be 
enforced, are not sufficient as part performance." 73 Am. Jur. 
2d Statute of Frauds § 409, at 36 (1976). 
An analysis of the alleged acts of part performance in 
this case reveals that none of the foregoing requirements have 
been satisfied and that the acts were merely preparatory. 
Rasmussen alleges that he obtained a small business 
administration loan to expand his business, he prepared plans and 
specifications to remodel the subject space and to remodel 
certain space owned by Deseret Federal at a separate location, 
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and paid certain disputed construction costs to Crossroads which 
were unrelated to the subject space. Rasmussen did not take 
possession of the subject space or make any improvements thereon, 
much less improvements that are "substantial and valuable." 
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that Rasmussen 
paid any valuable consideration to Deseret Federal. Rasmussen 
implies that somehow the payment of disputed construction costs 
to Crossroads might satisfy the consideration requirement. 
However, that sum was paid to Crossroads, not to Deseret Federal. 
The preliminary acts taken by Rasmussen are not 
exclusively referable to an alleged contract that the parties had 
already made. See Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983). 
The loan obtained by Rasmussen could have been used for expansion 
of his business into any space or his existing space. Moreover, 
prudent parties frequently prepare plans, secure financing, or 
make other arrangements in preparation for an agreement to be 
consummated. The payment of disputed construction costs to 
Crossroads is not exclusively referable to the alleged oral 
contract. Crossroads and Rasmussen certainly could have resolved 
a dispute about construction costs unrelated to the subject space 
without regard to any oral agreement that the subject space would 
be leased to Rasmussen. 
The analysis and result in Pacific Cascade Corp. v. 
Nimmer, 25 Wash. App. 552, 608 P.2d 266 (1980), should control in 
this case. In Nimmer, an owner of land sent a letter to a 
prospective lessee expressing an intent to lease a portion of the 
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landf setting forth the general terms for the lease and stating 
that the terms remained subject to appropriate documentation. 
The letter was accompanied by a 58 page draft of the lease. In 
anticipation that the lease would be finalized, the prospective 
lessee conducted a survey and soil test of the property, but did 
not take possession of any part of the property or make any 
improvements thereon or tender the payment of any rentals. Id. 
at 670. The court held that the preliminary acts of obtaining a 
survey and soil test did not constitute part performance. 
This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the doctrine 
of part performance is not available in cases, such as the 
instant case, involving the purchase, sale, or lease of land 
where the party does not take possession of the land, does not 
make any payments, and does not make any valuable improvements. 
See, e.g. , Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), McDonald 
v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981), 
Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). 
Because Rasmussen did none of the foregoing acts, part 
performance is unavailable under Utah law. 
In sum, the acts relied upon by Rasmussen were 
preparatory or ancillary to the alleged agreement and were merely 
based on Rasmussen1s expectation that the transaction would be 
consummated. 
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B. Rasmussen Has Not Fully Performed the Alleged Oral 
Agreement, 
The second category of cases in which this court 
has applied the doctrine of part performance includes cases where 
a clear and definite oral contract has been fully performed. See 
McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp., 631 P.2d 851, 853 
(Utah 1981). For example, in Randall v. Tracy Collins Bank & 
Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956), an 
elderly aunt promised to devise property to her nephew if her 
nephew took care of her. The nephew fully performed the contract 
by changing his residence from Ogden to Provo, taking care of his 
aunt, and managing her affairs. Because the nephew had fully 
performed the contract, the Court concluded that equity required 
that the contract be specifically enforced. 
Another case in this category is Martin v. Scholl, 678 
P.2d 274 (Utah 1983), the only case relied upon by Rasmussen on 
this issue. In Martin, a ranch laborer sought to enforce an oral 
agreement by a ranch owner to convey certain real property. The 
laborer fully performed by working long, hard hours for the owner 
and declining other and better offers of employment. Those acts 
may have been sufficient, except the Court concluded that the 
acts were not exclusively referable to the contract. 
Consequently, the Court held the agreement void under the statute 
of frauds. 
The facts in this case are not even remotely similar to 
the facts in Randall or Martin. In this case, Rasmussen at best 
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performed various preparatory acts in anticipation that the 
transaction would be finalized and the lease documents signed. 
Rasmussen did not make lease payments, complete the remodeling of 
space for Deseret Federal, remodel the subject space, or 
otherwise perform the alleged agreement. Because Rasmussen has 
not fully performed the alleged agreement, the part performance 
argument must fail as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Rasmussen's disappointment from negotiations that did 
not come to fruition cannot sustain this action. Deseret 
Federal's expression of a willingness to release its leasehold 
interest in space at Crossroads Mall was not a legally binding 
promise. Even if it were construed as a promise, the terms of 
the promise were expressly conditioned upon execution of final 
written documentation and upon other events that never took 
place. 
As Judge Sawaya properly concluded, the alleged oral 
agreement is void under the Utah statute of frauds. The doctrine 
of promissory estoppel is unavailable in this case for the simple 
reason that no agreement was ever made upon which reliance could 
be placed. Moreover, there is no evidence of an intent by 
Deseret Federal to abandon its right to assert the statute of 
frauds. The documents expressly reaffirmed that Deseret Federal 
fully intended to rely upon the protection of the statute. 
Finally, there are no sufficient memoranda of the alleged oral 
agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds and the preparatory 
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acts taken by Rasmussen do not constitute part performance 
sufficient to bar the statute's application. 
The facts in the record fully support the district 
court's conclusion that summary judgment is proper in this case. 
Deseret Federal therefore respectfully requests this Court to 
affirm the summary judgment entered in its favor and dismiss this 
appeal. 
DATED this ^f^a ay of October, 1985. 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR^CROCKETT 
Ranald G. Russell, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Association 
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ADDENDUM 1 
'EDKK*1' ^-v VINCS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 




B a r c a l 
s P l a z a / - - " o c i a t e i 
C i t y / U ' a h S-U44 
j f h S a r c a l : 
.space o n t / i e main, p l a z a l e v e l . 
!l 
*-o orovJ^e you with the authority necessary to manage this 
"oeserct Federal grants permission to your office to act 
"agent under the following conditions; 
The soacc i s available only to Vaughn Rasmussen. 
D^seret Federal Savings is unconditionally released from 
a U tenar.r- responsibility for the subject space. 
J. D-So~^ federal savings will not pay any fees, charges or 
ci'mmissi^5 t o * nY Party f o r £ny r e £ S O n relative to tne 
subject t-ransactior.. 
{. D^seret ?--dera^ and Vaughn Rasmussen additional agreements 
*re full/ executed. 
:r a-vy reason' Vaughn Rasmussen should choose to discontinue 
?'ans"to occu-py the subject space, Deseret Federal Savings is 
iatere^ted iro ^ ny further proposals. 




*°f Vice Prer. •_ cen t 
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arch 9, 1983 
r. Bruce Cundick 
eseret Federal Savings & Loan 
D South Main 
alt Lake City, Utah 8*144 
E: Partial Surrender of Premises 
ear Mr. Cundick: 
lease accept this letter, as an expression of intent 
Dr Crossroads Plaza to release Deseret Federal Savings 
rote approximately 790.5 square feet of their space 
t Crossroads Plaza. The purpose of this surrender will 
> solely used for Mr. Vaughn Rasmussen and the estab-
Lshment of an additional shoe store at Crossroads Plaza. 
: is understood that Mr. Rasmussen will absorb all ex-
*nses regarding the demising and reconstruction of the 
remises. 
ravco, Inc. is presently preparing leases and lease 
jrrender forms for the square footage discussed. You 
lould be receiving the lease surrender form in approxim-
ately five (5) business days. 




Mr. Howard Swapp 
Mr. Vaughn Rasmussen 
KRAVCO, Lease File 
Deseret Federal Lease File 
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